Maserati’s 71% sales collapse makes a China rescue a capacity play—not a U.S. software test

On June 17, Stellantis CEO Antonio Filosa said Maserati was negotiating with “two important partners” that could contribute technology, development and ideas. The current report identifies Huawei and Anhui Jianghuai Automobile, but neither company has announced a signed Maserati contract. The transaction therefore remains in diligence rather than contract execution.

Maserati posted a €198 million adjusted operating loss in 2025, compared with a 27,000-vehicle sales base only two years earlier. By contrast, Stellantis shipped 5.484 million vehicles group-wide in 2025; Maserati represents less than 0.15% of that total. A success would lift Italian fixed-cost absorption without deciding the parent’s earnings trajectory because spreading plant costs over more cars matters more than restoring a few thousand units.

The strongest evidence for a working operating model is Anhui Jianghuai Automobile’s 2025 annual report: Maextro S800 deliveries exceeded 10,000 by Dec. 31, 2025, and its factory was recognized as a national smart-manufacturing benchmark. Yet the company reported CNY46.48 billion of revenue and a CNY1.70 billion attributable loss. The company’s reusable asset is a proven operating lane, not a clean balance sheet.

The capacity logic is substantial. Filosa put current European capacity utilization at 60% against a target above 80% by 2030, and said a Maserati partnership would lift production at Modena and Cassino. For Anhui Jianghuai, the attraction is repeatable high-end manufacturing work; for Maserati, it is faster access to software and additional plant volume.

The reported Maextro-in-China and Maserati-international structure directly determines the regulatory outcome. The U.S. Commerce Department’s January 2025 final rule restricts covered China- or Russia-linked software and hardware in connected vehicles sold in the American market. The disclosed market split avoids a known U.S. conflict today; a future U.S.-sold Maserati with covered HIMA software would still face the rules.

Stellantis can support a measured turnaround bet, but the second-quarter recovery does not eliminate the Maserati problem. Europe remains loss-making at the margin, tariff costs are rising, and no agreement has fixed the brand’s unit economics. Maserati must absorb fixed costs before its low volume repairs cash burn.

Filosa said every new Stellantis partnership would carry a 51% Stellantis stake. Applying that template to Maserati is an inference, not a disclosed term. If it holds, Stellantis would retain control while Huawei contributes software and product expertise and Anhui Jianghuai supplies engineering and manufacturing; Maserati contributes design, brand and its international retail channel. The likely result is faster product development and more Italian production, not an automatic restoration of luxury pricing.